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COMMERCIAL LAW
OVERVIEW
This section comments briefly on Tenth Circuit cases applying the law of banks and banking, creditor-debtor relations, and
the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). Extended comment of
the court's analysis in each case is not provided in this section,
since the primary objective of the overview is to acquaint the
reader with only the essential facts and holdings of the more
significant cases of this year in the Tenth Circuit. However, several opinions in the UCC section reflect comparatively greater
significance in terms of new legal theories and receive more consideration.

I.

BANKS AND BANKING

Harr v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board' [HarrI] and Harr
v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association2 [Harr II
were companion cases dealing with the remedies available to petitioners who sought to challenge a conversion plan whereby Prudential Federal Savings & Loan, a federally chartered mutual
savings and loan association, would become a federally chartered
stock association.
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan was created as a federally
chartered mutual savings and loan association under the Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933.1 Prudential drafted a plan whereby it
would convert from a mutual savings and loan association to a
federally chartered stock association as provided by section 402(j)
of the National Housing Act.' The approved plan provided for the
issuance, without charge, of stock to persons who were depositors
as of July 13, 1972. The conversion plan became operative April
15, 1976. 5
In HarrI, the petitioners sought judicial review of the order
issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank approving the conversion
plan pursuant to section 408a(k) of the Housing Act.' The Bank
1 557

F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1977).

2 557 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1977).

Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, § 5(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1976).
National Housing Act of 1934, § 402U), 12 U.S.C. § 1725(0) (1976).
557 F.2d at 749.
According to the court, Order No. 75-1164 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
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Board asserted that the petitioners should not be allowed to proceed because they had not exhausted their administrative remedies by filing timely objections with the Bank Board. The court
recognized that administrative remedies must be exhausted in
virtually all instances where judicial review is sought, but that,
in this case, the exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
required because the notices affirmatively stated that there
would be an unconditional right to court review.' Therefore, the
petitioners were allowed to proceed with the petition for review.8
The petitioners alleged that the conversion plan was unfair
because of the lapse of time between the record date of July 13,
1972, and the effective date of conversion of April 15, 1976; that
the conversion by issuance of "free" stock was improper; that the
proxy solicitation material was misleading and false; and that
there was no authority to convert deposits in a mutual association
into stock In response to these allegations, the court referred to
the 1974 amendments to the National Housing Act and the Securities Exchange Act embodied in Public Law 93-495.10 The

court recognized that the time lapse created problems, but noted
Congress had mandated the record date and, therefore, the lapse
did not invalidate the conversion." The issuance of "free" stock
was permitted under the grandfather provisions of the final
amendments to section 402 of the National Housing Act. The
Bank Board was authorized to supervise and approve the conversion process under section 402 of the Housing Act. 3 Public Law
93-495 amended section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act directing the Bank Board to supervise and administer proxy solicitaapproved the plan. Id. at 748. Petitioner sought review pursuant to the National Housing
Act of 1934, § 408(k), 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(k) (1976): "Any party aggrieved by an order of
the Corporation under this section may obtain a review of such order by filing in the court
of appeals of the United States ....
"
I "This is not an instance of silence as to possible remedy, but an affirmative misleading statement, the statement being that court review would be available." 557 F.2d at 749.
1 For a discussion of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, see Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411 (1965); Bank of
Commerce v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 513 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1975); Bank
of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975).
' 557 F.2d at 749.
0 Pub. L. No. 93-495 §§ 105(b), 105(d), 88 Stat. 1504 (1974) (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 1725(j) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1976)).
1 557 F.2d at 750.
12 12 U.S.C. § 1725(j) (1976).
13

Id.
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tions.1' After examining the record, the court held that the proxy
solicitation material was neither false nor misleading. Finally, the
conversion was authorized by law upon a proper vote of a majority
of shareholders. 5 The petition for review was, therefore, dismissed. 11

In Harr II, plaintiffs challenged the conversion plan in a
collateral attack under rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act. 7 Plaintiffs alleged (1) That the conversion plan was part of
a conspiracy by the directors to benefit themselves and the officers; (2) that the plan
was unfair and deceptive; and (3) that rule
8
10b-5 was violated.1
The Tenth Circuit again referred to the changes made in 1974
to the National Housing Act and the Securities Exchange Act and
affirmed the trial court's holding that section 402(j)(4) of the
Housing Act, 9 as it refers to section 408(k) of the same Act,2
creates an exclusive remedy to review a determination by the
bank board." The court cited Fort Worth National Corp. v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp.2" which considered the remedy available under section 408(k):
When Congress has prescribed a particular method of review, that
procedure is exclusive. .

.

. By specifying that appeals under sec-

" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1970), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 105(b), 88 Stat. 1503 (1974). The Bank Board is authorized to issue
rules as to conversions. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1725(j), 1730a(l) (1976).
" 557 F.2d at 751. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1725(j), 1730a(l) (1976).
557 F.2d at 751.
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
(A) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(B) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a

material fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not

misleading, or
(C) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates...
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the. . . sale of any
security.
II 557 F.2d at 751, 753.
" 12 U.S.C. § 1725()(4) (1976). This section provides in part that: "Any aggrieved
person may obtain a review of a final action of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board...

which approves . . . a plan of conversion . . . only by complying with the provisions of

subsection (k) of section 1730a of this title ....
2 National Housing Act § 408(k), 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(k) (1976). This section provides
that the petition for review to the Court of Appeals "shall be exclusive, to affirm, modify,
terminate, or set aside, in whole or in part the order of the corporation."
11557 F.2d at 753.
469 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1972).
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tion 1730a(k) were to be filed in the Court of Appeals, Congress
expected to prevent conflicting rulings and duplicative proceedings
that inevitably would result from permitting collateral attack of
Corporation orders in the various district courts .... 2

The cause of action must, in the first instance, be a challenge to
the approval by the Bank Board of the plan of conversion and of
the proxy materials. A Rule 10b-5 claim would be at best a secondary action based on the consequences or impact of the plan
on the plaintiffs. The appeal was dismissed."
II.

CREDITOR-DEBTOR RELATIONS
Motor Co.2 5 involved a suit brought

Begay v. Ziems
under the
Truth in Lending Act"' and regulation Z2 to recover damages for
alleged failure of the seller to disclose accurately and meaningfully the amount of any default, delinquency, or similar charges
payable in the event of late payments by the buyer. The primary
question concerned whether the acceleration provisions in the
sales contract constituted charges required to be disclosed in the
manner specified by the Act and the regulation." The contract
provision permitted the seller upon default of an installment to
declare all amounts due or to become due, immediately payable
and allowed the seller-creditor to retain unearned finance charges
following acceleration. 2
The Truth in Lending Act requires disclosure for default,
delinquency, or other similar charges payable because of late payments on a sales contract. 0 Regulation Z similarly provides for
disclosure of terms addressing the amount and method of computing charges for late payments. 31 In light of these requirements,

the defendant, Ziem Motor Co., argued that the default or accel557 F.2d at 754 (citing 469 F.2d at 52).
557 F.2d at 753.
550 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1977).
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, § 102, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j (1976).
21 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.15 (1977).
n 550 F.2d at 1245.
"

Id. at 1247.
' The Truth in Lending Act requires disclosure for "default, delinquency, or similar

charges payable in the event of late payments." 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(9) (1976).
" Regulation Z provides disclosure of terms covering "[tihe amount, or method of
computing the amount, of any default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the
event of late payments." 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1977).
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eration provisions of the contract were not charges required by the
Act and the regulation to be disclosed. 2
The court briefly reviewed conflicting case authority from
other circuits and accepted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in
Martin v. Commercial Securities Co.3 3 The court in Martin held
that an acceleration clause was not subject to the disclosure requirements because there is no reference to them in the Act, the
regulations, or the official interpretations of the Federal Reserve
34
Board.
The dissent in Begay pointed to the fact that since the acceleration provision included amounts due or to become due, the
seller-creditor had reserved, and could assert, the right to accelerate the entire debt, including the unearned finance charges. The
creditor could then collect all such unearned finance charges.3
The dissent continued by noting that this clause was not only the
assertion of a remedy by way of acceleration but also obligated
the debtor to pay additional, specific pecuniary sums. Therefore,
the dissent would require disclosure under the Act and regulation
Z.

A.

36

III. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Consolidated Film Industries v. United States

In ConsolidatedFilm Industries v. United States, 37 Consolidated Film Industries [hereinafter Consolidated] sought an injunction enjoining the United States from enforcing a tax levy
served on Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., the assignor of certain
contract rights to Consolidated.3 8 The main issue facing the court
was whether the Utah Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) required
the filing of a financing statement in order to perfect a security
interest in the assignment of contract rights.3 If filing was not
550 F.2d at 1247.
539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976).
, Id. at 529.
550 F.2d at 1249 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
3S Id.

37547 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1977).

" Consolidated was the assignee of certain contract rights granted by Inflight and,
as such, the court held it to be the proper party in interest for bringing the action. Id. at
534.
3 The Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides in part: "A financing statement
must be filed to perfect all security interests except the following . . .(e) an assignment
of accounts or contract rights which does not alone or in conjunction with other assign-
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required, the perfected security interest of Consolidated would
assume priority over, and preclude enforcement of, the tax levy.10
Consolidated contended that the assignment was a security
interest covered by a provision of the Utah UCC which exempted
from filing for perfection contract rights which are not a
significant part of the outstanding contract rights of the assignor." The trial court agreed with Consolidated and granted the
injunction against the United States. However, the Tenth Circuit
reversed on the ground that the assignment was a significant part
of the assignor's outstanding contract rights and therefore not
exempt. 2 The court stated that the burden of proof for establishing significance was upon the party claiming the exemption. In
this case, Consolidated had failed to meet its burden. 3
B.

Cargill, Inc. v. Van Stafford

In Cargill, Inc. v. Van Stafford," the court dealt with two
separate transactions for the sale of wheat by defendant Stafford
to plaintiff Cargill. The issue in the first transaction involved
whether Cargill's claim of an enforceable contract for the sale of
wheat was barred by the Statute of Frauds provision of the
UCC.45 The issue in the second transaction hinged upon determining the proper date for assessing damages for breach of a sales
contract under the UCC.11
On July 23, 1973, Cargill's agent telephoned Stafford concerning the purchase of wheat. Stafford replied that he had wheat
available. He concluded the conversation by instructing the agent
ments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the outstanding accounts or
contract rights of the assignor." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9-302(1)(e) (1968).
* 547 F.2d at 533.
41 Id.
42

Id. at 535.

Id. at 536-37. The court noted that the assignment constituted most of the outstanding accounts or rights of the assignor and that the assignee failed to present evidence
to the contrary.
" 553 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1977).
" The parties agreed that Colorado law applied in this case. Section 4-2-201(2) of the
Colorado Uniform Commercial Code provides in part: A writing is sufficient "[bletween
merchants, if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and
sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its
contents .... " COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-201(2) (1973).
" See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 4-2-712 to 713 (1973). Section 4-2-712 relates to damages
when the buyer procures substitute goods, i.e. "cover." Section 4-2-713 addresses the
measure of damages when "cover" is not used as a remedy.
"
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to forward a confirmation and, if it appeared proper, he would
sign and return it. The agent of Cargill prepared the confirmation
but addressed it improperly, delaying its arrival until August 17,
1973. Stafford refused to sign the confirmation, citing several
objections to its terms. Cargill brought suit for breach of contract.47
The trial court held that recovery for breach of contract was
foreclosed because of the Statute of Frauds provisions of the UCC
governing sales between merchants." The written confirmation
was not sufficient because it was not received within a reasonable
time following the contract. Thus the contract was unenforceable.49
The second transaction arose out of a telephone conversation
on July 31, 1973, in which a contract for the sale of wheat was
negotiated. A confirmation of the second sale was correctly addressed and mailed to Stafford in a reasonable time but contained several additional terms not negotiated by the parties. On
August 17, Stafford objected to the additional provisions and
declared the contract void. Cargill then brought suit for breach
of contract.50
The court held that the objection to the additional terms was
not made within the ten-day period provided by statute5' and
thus the confirmation was sufficient as written. The court decided, however, that the additional terms constituted a material
alteration of the contract and thus did not become a part of it.5"
Having found a valid, enforceable contract the court then
approached the more interesting question of damages for its
breach. Since the buyer did not employ the remedy of cover,53 the
buyer's damages were to be assessed in accordance with section
, 553 F.2d at 1223-24.
COLO.REv. STAT. § 4-2-201(2) (1973).
" 553 F.2d at 1225.
Id. at 1222, 1225.
"
Between merchants, an objection to a writing in confirmation of a contract must
be in writing and "given within ten days after it is received." COLO. Ry. STAT. § 4-2-201(2)
(1973).
" COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-207(2)(b) (1973) states that, between merchants, the additional terms become part of the contract unless they materially alter the contract.
0 "Cover" is a remedy by which a buyer may purchase substitute goods and recover
the difference in price between the original contract price and the price of the substituted
goods. COLO. REv. STAT. § 4-2-712 (1973).
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4-2-713 of the Colorado UCC. 54 The section provides that the
measure of damages is the difference between the market price
at the time the buyer learns of the breach and the contract price.55
The trial court awarded damages based on the market price as
of September 6, the date on which Stafford unequivocally stated
he would not perform. The Tenth Circuit, in interpreting section
4-2-713, ruled that the time at which the buyer learns of the
breach is the time for performance. In this case this would have
been September 30.5
The court then discussed the remedy of cover. Apparently
influenced by the comment to section 4-2-71311 dealing with damages for nondelivery or repudiation, the court stated that a buyer
should cover unless there is a valid reason for refusal. 8 This opinion placed the Tenth Circuit in a unique position in interpreting
the UCC. Cover apparently is not a mandatory remedy for recovery of damages. Until this decision, a buyer had the right to
choose between remedies without penalty in choosing one over
another. 9
C.

Barbour v. United States
In Barbourv. United States,'"the Tenth Circuit held that a
secured creditor's failure to sell repossessed goods in a commercially reasonable manner does not preclude recovery of a defi4 Section 4-2-713 provides in part: "[Tihe measure of damages for nondelivery or
repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price ....
" CoLo. REv. STAT. § 4-2-713
(1973).
"Id.
S 553 F.2d at 1226. This interpretation has gained some support in other jurisdictions
and by legal scholars. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 197-202
(1972).
57 COLO. REv. STAT. § 4-2-713, Official Comment 1 (1973).
The court stated:
At the end of a reasonable period he [the buyer] should cover if substitute goods are readily available. If substitution is readily available and buyer
does not cover within a reasonable time, damages should be based on the
price at the end of that reasonable time rather than on the price when
performance is due. If a valid reason exists for failure or refusal to cover,
damages may be calculated from the time when performance is due.
553 F.2d at 1227.
1, The author has not been able to locate any other court or legal scholar taking the
same position as the court in this case.
- 562 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1977).
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ciency judgment by the creditor.' The case involved a situation
where the Small Business Administration (SBA) lawfully repossessed secured equipment but then proceeded to sell it in what
failed to qualify as a commercially reasonable manner. The price
obtained at the sale was considerably less than the balance on the
underlying note and the SBA sued to recover the deficiency. Barbour, the debtor, counterclaimed based upon the SBA's failure to
comply with section 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) as adopted in Kansas.62
The courts have offered three different interpretations of the
effect of noncompliance with section 9-504(3) and its consequent
interaction with section 9-507(1),11 which provides the debtor
with a remedy upon a creditor's failure to comply with section 9504(3). The first interpretation holds that "compliance with section [9-504(3)] . . .is a condition precedent to a secured credi, Id. at 21.
§ 84-9-504(3) (Supp. 1977) reads as follows:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and
may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may
be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but
every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place
and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable
or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any
public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale
or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party
to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or
modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no
other notification need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to
any other secured party from whom the secured party has received (before
sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of
his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral. The
secured party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type
customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject
of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy at private sale.

' KAN. STAT.

9

KAN. STAT.

§ 84-9-507(1) (1965) reads as follows:

If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance
with the provisions of this part dispositon may be ordered or restrained on
appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor
or any person entitled to notification or whose security interest has been
made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right to
recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with
the provisions of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has
a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service
charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price
differential plus ten percent of the cash price.
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tor's right to recovery of any deficiency between the sale price of
collateral and the amount of the unpaid balance." 4 Assuming a
situation where a creditor fails to satisfy the commercial reasonableness test of section 9-504(3), obtains a reasonable price, and
yet a sizeable deficiency remains, this rule would bar a deficiency
judgment."5
The second interpretation does not automatically preclude
the creditor from obtaining a deficiency judgment but rather
"indulge[s] the presumption . . .that the collateral was worth
at least the amount of the debt, thereby shifting to the creditor
the burden of proving the amount that should reasonably have
been obtained through a sale conducted according to law.""8 This
line of authority thus allows the creditor a deficiency judgment
under section 9-504(3) but also permits the debtor an offset to the
extent of the difference between the sale price and what that price
should have been had the sale been conducted properly. Further,
the burden is upon the creditor to prove a value less than the
outstanding debt and the amount bid or received at the sale is
not considered evidence of its true value.6 7
" Herman Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Iowa 1977). See Skeels
v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), vacated on other
grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104
Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972); Washington v. First Nat'l Bank, 332 So. 2d 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Gurwitch v. Luxurest Furniture Mfg. Co., 233 Ga. 934, 214 S.E.2d 373 (1975); Braswell v.
American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); FDIC v. Farrar, 231
N.W.2d 602 (Iowa 1975); Beneficial Finance Co. v. Reed, 212 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1973);
Twin Bridges Truck City, Inc. v. Halling, 205 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1973); Camden Nat'l
Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 1973); Foundation Discounts, Inc. v. Serna, 81 N.M.
474, 468 P.2d 875 (1970); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc.
2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971); Aimonetto v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo.
1972).
U For a criticism of this rule, see, e.g., Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest
Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975).
U Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 150, 398 S.W.2d 538, 542
(1966). See Leasing Assocs., Inc. v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1971);
Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969); Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v.
Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970); Community Management Ass'n of Colo.
Springs, Inc. v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, 505 P.2d 1314 (1973); Wirth v. Heavey, 508
S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App. 1974); Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, 209 N.W.2d
341 (1973); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (Ocean
County Dist. Ct. 1971); T & W Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J. Super.
328, 258 A.2d 162 (Bergen County Ct. 1969); Investors Acceptance Co. v. James Talcott,
Inc., 61 Tenn. App. 307, 454 S.W.2d 130 (1969).
87 See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 668-69 453 S.W.2d 37,
39-40 (1970).
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The third line of cases most closely follows the provisions of
the UCC. They permit the secured creditor to recover a deficiency
judgment subject to an offset for damages to which the debtor is
entitled under section 9-507(1). Thus the creditor has the burden of proving his claim for a deficiency judgment without the
indulgence of any presumptions while the debtor has the burden
of proving his damages resulting from creditor's commercially
unreasonable sale.
The Tenth Circuit, interpreting Kansas law, adopted the
third interpretation," noting that section 9-507(1) provides a specific remedy for noncompliance with section 9-504(3) and therefore "a complete bar was not intended." 70 Further, the UCC prohibits "penal damages."'"
Constance C. Cox
Peter M. Johnson
Michael M. Page
See, e.g., United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1974);
Tauber v. Johnson, 8 Ill. App. 3d 789, 291 N.E.2d 180 (1972); Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin.
& Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966); Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Wollgast, 11 Wash. App. 117, 521 P.2d 1191 (1974); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6
Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
" 562 F.2d at 21.
70 Id.

71Id,

